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rAbstract
Decentralization in every walk of life has resulted in the development of Global Grid
networking. Data sharing and access depends on their availability, capability, cost
and user requirements. One of the needs for a secure Grid Environment is a strong
authentication for users. Since Authentication is the entry point into every network, a
novel smart card based authentication scheme has been proposed. The proposed
authentication scheme utilizes the biometric data embedded in a smart card along
with the ID and password of the user. The Time efficient performance of the
proposed scheme in comparison with the existing Secure Socket Layer based
authentication scheme is discussed. The attacks which the proposed scheme is able
to withstand are also discussed.
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Grid computing involves sharing heterogeneous resources which are located in geo-
graphically distributed places belonging to different administrative domains [1]. Grid
data sharing is not file exchange but rather access to computers, software, data and
other resources. Grid involves the creation of a dynamic Virtual Organization (VO).
Each virtual organization comprises of users and their resources and any other services
(S) joined by a common goal [2]. Each of the user or resource is available from differ-
ent administrative domains (DO). Each user/resource have their own trust policy
which requires a local to global and global to local mapping of the access policies as
discussed in [3].
The basic security for the Globus Toolkit (GT 4) is the Grid Security Infrastructure
(GSI) [4,5]. It depends on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), X.509 Proxy certificates
and Transport Layer Security (TLS) for authentication. GSI involves third party verifi-
cation for authorization. The GT framework is based on the Open Grid Services Archi-
tecture (OGSA) which uses the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) based on TLS. The GSI
security is secure enough but has scalability problems [5].
The existing authentication schemes are based on the user name and the password
and certificates which are generated by a secure Certificate Authority (CA) [5]. The
existing authentication schemes belong to two factor authentication scheme which in-
volves user name/password and some cards like those used in Banks. The Security for
the Grid Environment is deployed in the middleware which is used to access the grid2013 Kathrine et al.; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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ting Resources) [6], Globus [6], Legion [7] and Gridbus [8].
In [9] a Four-Factor based Biometric Authentication has been proposed. But the
addition of location does not guarantee the avoidance of insider attack. The proposed
authentication scheme optimizes the security of a grid environment by adding more
features like biometric data in a smart card for optimal authentication.
User authentication has been in discussion for a long time to enhance the security of
any system at the entry level itself. Many methods such as password based systems, ID
based systems, and etc. have been used. A hash-chain based remote user authentication
in which all the passwords are encoded is given in [10]. In all the initial remote based
authentication systems, a verifier table is to be placed in the server side which becomes
a problem if the server is compromised.
In this paper the remote based authentication system which is very much suited for
the Grid Environment is considered. Based on the existing remote authentication sys-
tems, an enhanced system is designed. In order to avoid maintaining a verifier table
Hwang et al., proposed a non-interactive smart card based scheme without verifier ta-
bles [11]. A finger print based remote user authentication scheme was proposed in
[12]. This scheme was found to be vulnerable to masquerade attacks and many other
attacks [13,14]. In [15-17], the biometric data itself is taken as a key for encryption/de-
cryption. The secret data is extracted by using the biometric template as the key. The
biometric data is to be stored in the server side and used for comparison. But for effect-
ive Biometric authentication, the process is to be done in the client side [18] to avoid
any problem due to the server being compromised [19]. In [20], the method has been
optimized with the matching being done in the server side. But the server does not
store any biometric data in its database thereby protecting the privacy of the user.
The method in [20] provides a three factor authentication which is password – some-
thing the user knows; smart card – something the user has; biometrics – something
the user is. A further enhancement to this type of authentication is to add a fourth fac-
tor thereby providing a four factor authentication [21]. The fourth factor can be the
addition of location of the user – someplace the user is. The military data sharing re-
quirements take into consideration the place in which the user is positioned so as to
find the location of any valid/invalid user. So, the sensitive areas of application require
security with some amount of privacy preservation. Section three gives an overview of
the existing authentication systems in grid computing. Section four discusses the pro-
posed security framework with reduced stages for authentication of a grid user.
Existing security framework for grid
A Grid Environment is created by means of using general-purpose grid software librar-
ies known as middle ware. The Grid environment is based on a layered architecture as
shown in Figure 1.
From the Figure 1, the security features are seen in the middleware portion of the
grid layer. The existing security solution uses Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA)
architecture [22]. This security feature used in GT is also used in Virtual Organization
Membership Services (VOMS) [23] for the purpose of authorization also. The OGSA
architecture uses GSI which in turn depends on the certificate based SSL for authenti-











Figure 1 Layered architecture of grid.
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thentication and authorization criteria. The scalability, heterogeneity and increase in at-
tacks have led to the need of a new security framework which is based on the existing
architecture with additional features to tackle the day to day attacks. The next section
discusses about the proposed authentication scheme.
Proposed authentication system
The proposed authentication scheme has three phases such as the Registration phase,
the Login phase and the Mutual Authentication phase. An additional password change
phase is added to ensure that the user can change his/her password when required. In
each phase distinct operations are defined for the user and the server. The proposed
authentication methodology is shown in Figure 2.
In the Registration phase, based on the details provided by the user along with the in-
puts given by the server, the smart card data is stored and given to the user through a
secure medium. Only during the Login and the mutual authentication phase is the user
and the server authenticated to each other. Once the mutual authentication is aRegistration Phase User registers
Login Phase User login for grid resource 
access/sharing
Mutual Authentication Both user and server 
authenticate each other
Figure 2 Proposed authentication methodology.
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The triple DES along with any other light-weight encryption algorithm can be used.
The process flow of the proposed authentication scheme is shown in Figure 3.
During the initialization phase, the server stores both the asymmetric and symmetric
key in its database. Once a user requests for registration, the server accepts the user’s
hashed password in a secure way. This way assures that the server does not know the
actual data and neither is data stored openly in any database within the server. The val-
idity of the user is checked based on the comparison of the hashed data rather than the
original data. This method of storage makes sure that the user’s data is not lost under
any circumstance.
All the hashed data are stored in the Registration/Authentication server’s database
and the encrypted data required for the further use of the user is stored in the smartUser
Register
Ok
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Asymmetric Key
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Figure 3 Process of the proposal authentication scheme.
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environment. The smart card does the initial validation of the user and then forwards the
user data to the server, where further authentication is the done. In the proposed scheme,
both the user and the server validate each other and hence it is complete mutual authenti-
cation. Only when the user and the server both satisfy the validation criteria then the data
transfer occurs. If the user validation does not succeed it is rejected or the user is re-
quested to start the authentication from the beginning of the login phase. The next sec-
tion gives the detailed explanation of each phase of the proposed authentication system.
Details of the authentication scheme
This authentication scheme involves three factors, using a smart card which holds the data of
what the user is i.e., the biometric data (B), what the user knows i.e., the password (PW), Iden-
tifier (ID) and the data that the user has i.e., smart card. This scheme has three phases such as
Registration Phase, Login phase and a mutual authentication phase. The added features are
the dynamic User ID (CID) and the dynamic server ID (SID). The Registration/Authentication
server is configured to support symmetric and asymmetric encryption and decryption. In grid
a client at one scenario can be the server at the next instant since it has to satisfy a need.
Hence this system should be in such a way that each user is able to identify the requestor of
the resource by his/her credentials. The notations used in this paper are given in Table 1.
Registration phase
During the registration phase, the user tries to register for a grid membership within a Vir-
tual Organization (VO). During the membership registration, the user is given a particular
Identifier (IDi). The user registers his/her biometric data (Bi) which maybe a fingerprint or
an iris template. The user also selects a random number r and a password (PWi).
The following are the series of steps done in the server:
a. Server generates public-private key pair (pk, sk) for asymmetric encryption/decryption.
b. Server generates a secret key x for symmetric encryption/decryption.
c. Both (x, sk) are kept secure in the server.Table 1 Notations used in this paper
S Server
Ui User
SID Identity of server Si
IDi Identity of user Ui
Bi Biometric data of Ui
(PWi) Password of Ui
h(.) One-way hash function
x The master secret key
(pk, sk) Public-private key pair
⊕ The exclusive-OR operation
‖ Message concatenation
R Random number generated by Ui
nu Nonce value generated by Ui
ns Nonce value generated by the server Si
Kathrine et al. Human-centric Computing and Information Sciences 2013, 3:16 Page 6 of 14
http://www.hcis-journal.com/content/3/1/16The operations done at the user side are:
a. The user records his/her user Identifier (IDi)
b. The user records the biometric template (Bi)
c. The user selects a random string r and password (PWi)
The user computes SBi = δ (Bi) = h(r ⊕ h(Bi)).The value of SBi is sent to the server se-
curely along with the one-way hash function h(.) of the Password and the identifier (IDi)
of the user. The server receives (IDi , h(PWi),SBi) through a secure channel. By using the
values sent by the user, the server computes, yi such that,
yi ¼ Ex IDi∥h PWið Þ∥SBiÞð ð1Þ
where Ex (.) represents the symmetric encryption using the secret key x The server
stores the user’s password (PWi) and the related identifier (IDi) of the user and the cal-
culated yi. The operations continued in the server side are:
a. Server computes K = h(IDi ‖ x)
b. Server stores (K, h(.), pk) in the smart card.
c. Server sends smart card to the user securely.
Once the user receives the smart card, a few entries are to be stored in it along with
the data already available in the smart card i.e., yi.
The following operations are done to confirm the registration:
a. The user enters the biometric data which can be an iris data /fingerprint Bi
b. The user encrypts the random number r with PWi such that EpWi rð Þ is obtained.
c. EpWi rð Þ is stored in the smart card.
d. SBi = δ (Bi) = h(r ⊕ h(Bi)) is stored in the smart card.
Login phase
A user Ui is allowed to enter the grid environment using his/her smart card. The user
enters his/her Password (PW)’ and does a biometric scan denoted by Bi . The user’s
smart card retrieves the random value “r” from EPW0 rð Þ by using the password (PW)’
entered by the user Ui. The smart card computes SB

i ¼ δ SB
0
i
  ¼ h r ⊕ h B0i
  
: This
value is compared with the already stored value of SBi = δ (Bi) = h(r ⊕ h(Bi)) to confirm
if the user is the same. Then the smart card generates a nonce value “nu” and computes
M = (K ⊕ nu). Then CIDi is calculated such that, CIDi = h (IDi ‖ nu).
Then value of C0 is computed such that,
C0 ¼ Epk M∥CIDi∥yi∥uð Þ ð2Þ
Where Ep :ð Þ denotes the encryption function using the server’s public key. “u” is thek
random value selected by the user during login time. To ensure the liveliness of the
user, a nonce value is added in the value of C0 along with the already existing random
values to add more security. C0 is sent to the server.
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Once C0 is received by the server, the server does the following operations,
a. Server decrypts C0 using its private key sk
b. Server computes “nu” such that n

u ¼ M⊕K where K = h(IDi‖ x). The server uses
the IDi obtained from yi.
c. The validity of the user is checked by using the Identifier IDi to the one received by
the server. By using the value of nu the value of CID

i is calculated.
d. Then the value of CIDi is compared with the value of CIDi to check if CIDi ¼ CIDi .
e. Also the value of IDi can be verified with the ID stored in the ID table for the users
at the server end. A comparison of ID’s is done to make sure that verification is
done correctly even when the Server ID table is corrupted.
f. The remaining terms of C0 i.e., (h (PWi) ‖ SBi) is retained for future reference.
Server computes a values of C1 such that
C1 ¼ Eu N∥SED∥SID∥vð Þ ð3Þ
Where SID = Server’s identity and v is the random number chosen by the server and
u is the random number selected by the user and sent in C0. The server generates a
nonce value “ns” and computes N = (K ⊕ ns). From the value of ns, the value of the
symmetric key u is generated. Server ID SED = h(SID ‖ ns). The dynamic ID and ns is
used to make sure that the data was not tampered during transmission. Server sends
C1 to the user Ui.
In the User Side, the following operations are done,
a. The smart card decrypts C1 using the random value of u.
b. The value of SID is checked for valid server ID. The smart card computes SED

¼ h SID jjns
 
using its nonce value ns . Smart Card computes “n

s ” such that n

s ¼ N⊕
K where K = h(IDi‖ x).
c. Then SED* is calculated by using the value of the generated ns and IDi., i.e., SED

¼ h SID jjns
 
: If SED* = SED, then the server is valid and the data has not been
tampered with.
The smart card calculates the following value
C2 ¼ Ev h PWð Þð Þ0 ∥ SBi 0 ð4Þ
The server decrypts C2 using v and calculates the value of yi from the values sent in
C2. If yi ¼ yi, the server matches the values of the password and the biometric template
to confirm the authenticity of the user.
If an attacker is to attack, he/she has to deduce the random and the nonce values
which makes the attack much difficult. The value of SBi in C2 is compared with SBi of
yi. If the value match is within a threshold range then the user is confirmed valid. The
three phases are considered for computing the cost since they will be used repeatedly.
Once all the steps have been completed successfully, it is clear that mutual authentica-
tion of both the user and the server is done for login of the user. The server secret
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which is shared with the server.
Password change phase
The user Ui is authenticated by using the Password (PW’) used initially for login
process. Once authenticated, the user is prompted to enter the new password. Once
the new password (PW”) is entered, the yi = Ex (IDi ‖ h(PWi) ‖ SBi) value of h(PWi) is
replaced with the value of h(PWi”). An intimation of the password change is given to
the server and it replaces the old password for the user identifier with the new pass-
word. Thereby the user is allowed to further login by using the new password.
Implementation of the proposed authentication scheme
In this section, the performance and functionality of the proposed authentication
scheme is analysed and comparison has been made with the existing SSL based Au-
thentication used in the OGSA framework of Globus Toolkit.
The biometric matching is not done mostly in the smart card in proposed scheme
but rather in the remote server without losing the privacy of the biometric data. Any
light-weight public-key cryptosystem can be used for the encryption and decryption
process. The total time taken for the execution of the proposed algorithm is purely
based on the crypto-algorithm selected for the process of encryption and decryption.
In our proposed Scheme, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) based on block ci-
pher is used. Also Rivest Cipher 4(RC4) algorithm which uses stream cipher can be
used. RSA of 1024 bits [24] is used for the Asymmetric Encryption. The AES algorithm
used here has a key length of 128 bits and RC4 algorithm of 128 bit key length can be
used. The time taken for execution of the SSL based authentication in milliseconds
(ms) is shown in Table 2. The algorithm is executed for an input of 10 users each of a
26 kB biometric finger print image. MD5 scheme has been used for hashing.
Performance analysis of initial/registration phase
A simple Grid environment was created and the security algorithm was implemented
for 10 users. A simple hosting environment has been created as presented by [25]. In a
Microsoft .NET platform and J2EE application server as an administrative server, the
hosting environment has been implemented for 10 connected users. The time taken forTable 2 Total time taken for registration and authentication
User Time taken for each
access-proposed scheme (ms)
Time taken for registration and
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lated. The resistance of the security algorithm to attacks has been analysed in the next
section through the equations. Based on the time factor criteria, the implementation of
the proposed algorithm is based on the following system configuration of Processor
Speed – 2.13 GHz, RAM size 3.00 GB, System Type – 32-bit OS. The implementation
has been done in Java. The time taken for the Initial process and authentication of each
user is shown in Table 2.
The Table 2 gives the time taken for each user for the initial registration and access
in to the grid environment. The Figure 4 is the corresponding chart for Table 2. From
the graph it is clear that the time taken for initial registration of a user using smart card
is marginally more than the existing SSL based scheme. The Table 3 shows the time for
each user login and authentication. It is the time taken for a single access into the grid
network. The corresponding graph is shown in Figure 5. From the graph it is clear that
the time for each access is very less when compared to the time taken for the SSL
based authentication. Table 4 gives the total time taken for the users as they increase in
entering into the grid environment. The Figure 6 gives the corresponding graph for the
Table 4. From Table 4 it is clear that the time for the combined registration and access
is more in the initial phase due to the collection of biometric data and the smart card
distribution. The Figure 6 is the graph for Table 4.
In Table 5, the time taken for each access of user login is given. The Figure 7 is the
corresponding graph for Table 5. The Figure 7 shows that the total time for each user
login is very less when compared to that of the SSL based authentication scheme. It is
clear from the collected data, that though the time for initial operation is more for
from the Figures 5 and 7, it is clear that even though the registration phase of each user
is more, the time taken for each access is much lesser than the time taken for execution
of the SSL scheme. This increase in time during initial stages is very much compen-
sated during each user access. It is clear from the data collected that the selection of
the encryption algorithm used for encryption influences the time taken for completion
of the execution of the process. Lightweight algorithms like Camellia [26] in place of
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Figure 4 User vs total time taken for registration and authentication.
Table 3 Time taken for each grid access
User Time taken for each
access-proposed scheme (ms)
Time taken for each
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thentication scheme.
Security analysis of the proposed authentication scheme
In this section, the security and performance analysis of the proposed authentication
scheme are presented. The attacks which are withstood by the proposed scheme of au-
thentication are explained.
ID-theft attack
As in equation C0 ¼ Epk M∥CIDi∥yi∥uð Þ , a dynamic user ID named as CIDi is created
by the smart card based on the nonce value nu instead of using the user’s own ID. This
helps to withstand the ID-theft attack and also preserves the privacy of the user.Clock synchronization and replay attack problem
In [27], the problem in timestamp based authentication is given as replay attack due to






















Figure 5 User vs time for each login.
Table 4 Initial time taken for SSL based and proposed scheme
No. of users Total time for no. of
users - SSL based (sec)
Total time for no. of
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of timestamps, a nonce value nu is used each time the user sends his/her data and a
nonce value ns is also used by the sever to proclaim the server’s validity. Since a nonce
value such as nu and ns in equations C0 ¼ Epk M∥CIDi∥yi∥uð Þ where M = (K ⊕ nu) and
C1 = Eu (N ‖ SED ‖ SID ‖ v ‖ poss) where N = (K ⊕ ns) can be used only once, and not
repeated, the user/server can be safeguard themselves from replay attacks.
Modification attack
Each authentication message in from equation (1), (2), (3) and (4) include a one-way
hash function along with an encryption algorithm. The hash value in each equation re-
quires a nonce value or a random value. Even if the attacker gets hold of each of these
equations the decryption part and breaking the hash function is not possible. If the at-
tacker has the value of h(PWi), to find the password, the attacker needs find an equiva-
lent of the hash function by trying each password. This attack is difficult because the
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Figure 6 Performance analysis in terms of total time taken initially.
Table 5 Time for access of all the 10 users
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get all the values correct is impossible which makes modification attack difficult. With-
out knowing the actual data of these two values, the original data cannot be modified.
Modification of the equations will be noted by the legitimate user and server and since
all the messages are linked, it makes modification attack harder.
Mutual authentication
At the end of the mutual authentication phase, both the server and the client authen-
ticate each other thereby establishing mutual authentication. During each phase, of
the equations C0, C1 and C3, the user and server check the validity of each other using
the values of CID, SED, M, N. If the server has any doubt in the validity of the user, the
message C2 can be asked to be resent.
Man-in-the-middle attack
An attacker A who tries to do a man-in-the middle attack needs to know the decryp-
tion keys u, v and r in each message signal else its message will be discarded by the ser-
























Figure 7 Total time for user access.
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The smart card holds the value of (IDi, yi, h(.), pk) where, yi = Ex (IDi ‖ h(PWi) ‖ SBi). If
the smart card is compromised, the data it provides is not easily accessible to the at-
tacker. Without knowing the matching password and the ID of the user, the attacker
cannot move further along the authentication phase. Knowing the public key of the ser-
ver complicates matters since the attacker has to find the encryption algorithm and a
matching value of C0 to send to the server. Furthermore, the hash function has to be
broken in order to get the secret data. The biometric data is stored in the open for any-
one to copy it. It is stored in the form of a template combined with a random string
which needs to be found to get the data. Thus the data stored in the smart card is
secure.
Conclusion and future work
The proposed authentication scheme has provided an enhanced security with an opti-
mal overall time taken for the operation. The authentication scheme can be made more
secure by using a triple DES algorithm but it increases the security criteria and also in-
creases the overall time taken for authentication. By increasing the security during the
authentication phase itself we can try to minimize any other malicious insider attacks
and also reduce external attacks. The increase in time during registration is one-time
value and hence it is not considered as a disadvantage. The biometric data used for au-
thentication can also be used in the consecutive authorization process thereby lessening
the database space utilized by reusing the data used in authentication. The AES, RC4
algorithm can be replaced by any other light weight encryption algorithm like camellia.
Further study has to be done by using different combination of algorithms. The data’s
used for authentication can also be used for authorizing the user for a resource access.
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